Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy (Studies in Continental Thought)

Lawrence Hass has written an excellent introduction to Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. The other reviewers have already pointed out some of the things which make this a good introduction and I agree with their assessments completely. Hass writes accessibly but without sacrificing depth. I thought his explanations of Merleau-Ponty's late philosophy, especially Merleau-Ponty's notions of the flesh, reversibility, and ecart were some of the best I have read. Hass also brings Merleau-Ponty into dialogue with a number of other philosophers such as Levinas and Deleuze. His comparisons between Merleau-Ponty and Levinas on alterity I thought were especially excellent. Not only was it one of the better explanations of Merleau-Ponty's theory of alterity that I have read but it was some of the clearest and most interesting writing on Levinas I have ever read as well. Hass also draws attention to the importance of Merleau-Ponty's new expressive notion of cognition, which is an important and often overlooked area of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. So this book has a lot to recommend it and is certainly required reading for anyone interested in Merleau-Ponty or phenomenology in general. The rest of my review is a more detailed analysis of some of the main ideas expressed in this book and can be skipped by anyone who is uninterested.I.Merleau-Ponty was a phenomenologist in the tradition of Husserl and Heidegger. Phenomenology has drawn a great deal of criticism particularly from philosophers in the analytic traditions of philosophy. Phenomenology is accused of being irrational, subjectivistic, and immune to criticism. Hass attempts, in his introduction to this book, to defend phenomenology from these criticisms and he does an excellent job.Hass points out that phenomenological reasoning is indeed a form of reasoning, arguing, and persuading though it is different from both the inductive and deductive methods of reasoning. Anyone who is at all familiar with phenomenological literature, or who has spent any time studying phenomenology, will know that phenomenologists often disagree with each other and in doing so offer arguments and counter-arguments in support of their claims. None of this would be possible if phenomenology were simply a form of irrationalism.Hass also points out that adopting the methodology of phenomenology in approaching philosophical problems does not at all imply an adherence to a subjectivistic ontology. Both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, who are certainly two of the most important and influential phenomenologists along with Husserl, were both highly critical of subjectivism and of subjectivistic interpretations of experience. The overcoming of such subjectivism is one of the primary motivations behind both of their philosophies.Phenomenology is not, therefore, defined by an adherence to a subjective approach to philosophical problems. Hass gives a much better expression to what defines the phenomenological method when he writes, "as a movement phenomenology enacts a kind of vigilance about views, models, practices, and pedagogies; it seeks to uncover abstraction in them so that we don't become problematically invested in ontologically derivative notions...as Merleau-Ponty argues time and time again, these abstractions lead to bad metaphysics...On another level, if we embrace abstractions we become blind to the actual character of worldly experience" (pg. 8).The attempt to uncover abstractions and the attempt to show metaphysically derivative notions for what they truly are, as well as a desire to illuminate the true nature of experience which is often covered over by such abstractions is what defines phenomenology and the phenomenological method. This does not at all imply a subjectivistic ontology.II.One example of how Merleau-Ponty uses the methods of phenomenology to decontruct metaphysically derivative notions is his analysis of what he calls the "sensation fallacy" which is the subject of the first chapter of Hass's book. As Hass describes in his first chapter Merleau-Ponty was particularly interested in exposing the abstractions and ontologically derivative notions that surround our usual understanding of perception. An abstract understanding of perception, built around what Merleau-Ponty calls `the sensation fallacy', underlies a great deal of metaphysical confusion in modern philosophy. Put as simply as possible the sensation fallacy is the belief that our sensations and perception are built up out of atomistic and independent sense-qualia.The first thing to point out is that this theory of perception obscures the true nature of perception. If truth is, as Heidegger argued, unconcealedness then this theory cannot be considered true since it conceals from us the true nature of perception. We come to understand our own perception based on derivative notions and wind up missing its true character. Perception, Merleau-Ponty argues, is never of isolated sense-qualities. As Hass says, "perceptual experience is always complex, a figure against a background, a thing amid a context" (pg. 29).To define sensation in terms of sense-qualities is also misleading because it entraps perception within a sphere of immanence. Perception is related to sense-data conceived as ideas within the mind, as opposed to being an opening onto the world. We are then faced with the serious question as to whether we have any access to the world at all. Perhaps we are merely trapped within our own minds? We can see how the traditional understanding of perception tends in the direction of solipsism.For Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, "Our most basic perceptions...are not pure, atom-like qualia, but meaning-laden perspectives that open up a host of possible behavioral and affective responses...Related to this basic intentionality is another feature of perception that is present in our experience. This is the fact, the knowledge by direct acquaintance, that in perception I am opening onto things that transcend me, that go beyond me and my ideas" (pg. 33). It is one of the constitutive features of perception that it is an opening upon a world and that it is an access to beings that transcend our awareness of them.The sensation fallacy has other implications as well. First, the subject of sensation for the empiricists and rationalists (both of whom agree in their basic understanding of the nature of perception) tends to be conceived as an unworldly or immaterial subject. Hass quotes Descartes as saying "it is the soul which sees, and not the eyes" (pg. 16). The subject is removed from the world which passes before it like images against a blank screen. The subject plays the role of uniting these various images into a coherent form.Merleau-Ponty is highly critical of this notion of the subject. Merleau-Ponty has something very interesting to say in this regard in his Phenomenology of Perception where he writes, "the synthesis of visual and tactile worlds in the person born blind and operated upon, the constitution of an intersensory world must be effected in the domain of sense itself...The senses are distinct from each other and distinct from intellection in so far as each one of them brings with it a structure of being which can never be exactly transposed. We can recognize this because we have rejected any formalism of consciousness, and made the body the subject of perception" (pg. 261).A person who is born blind lives within a purely tactile world (and auditory as well). If the blind person is operated on and regains their sight the subject is faced with the task of synthesizing the tactile and visual worlds so that they are both aspects of a single world. Merleau-Ponty is arguing that this operation is not carried out by a transcendental subject that lies behind the senses (something akin to Kant's transcendental unity of apperception). The synthesis must be carried out within sense itself. Each sense brings with it its own particular structure which cannot be fully described or transposed onto the other senses (and cannot, therefore, be understood as sensations passing before a mind). This is a long winded way of saying that for Merleau-Ponty it is the body that perceives and not the soul (the exact reverse of Descartes's statement).For Merleau-Ponty it is the living, breathing human subject that is the true subject of perception. The subject that exists in a certain place and sees everything from a certain perspective; the subject that is temporally determined; the subject that is the result of thousands of years of biological evolution; and the subject that will one day die.I would like to highlight one final implication of the sensation fallacy and then bring this review to a close. The notion that our sensations are built up from atomistic sensations, which implies that any meaning we ascribe to our sensations is a result of the activity of the mind, means that complex objects are derivative. Our experience of other people, for instance, cannot be conceived as ontologically primary. But like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty does not believe that being-with is derivative or parasitic upon our relation to mere things or sense-qualities. Merleau-Ponty sees our experience as being based in the system of self-others-things, and as Hass rightly observes, "These modalities all have equal weight and must be understood as co-original in the fabric of living experience" (pg. 101). The sensation fallacy is again responsible for distorting our true experience when it argues that we are related first to things, and to sensations, and from there are forced to make an inference to the existence of other people, or other selves.III.In conclusion I would simply reiterate my appreciation for this book. This book traces the entire trajectory of Merleau-Ponty's thought and my review has really only scratched the surface. I have really only analyzed the very first chapter. I would recommend this book to anyone interested in Merleau-Ponty, or anyone interested in philosophy in general. Even if you are not interested in Merleau-Ponty you should be after reading this work.

Lawrence Hass's introduction to phenomenology is a marvellous piece of work, which manages to elucidate Merleau-Ponty's ideas without over-simplification or "dumbing down" the sometimes thorny complexity of his philosophical project. Given the current pace of advancement of cognitive science, it seems that the time has come for Merleau-Ponty's thinking around embodiment to receive some overdue acknowledgement, and Hass clearly understands the significance of Merleau-Ponty's ideas for a new epistemological framework, one with due regard for the place of the body and intentionality in philosophy of mind.Hass is not afraid to point out some potential problems in Merleau-Ponty's work, and this unbiased attitude of inquiry brings to the book a balanced outlook and some useful connections to the theories of other continental philosophers, especially Derrida and Levinas. Hass also describes with some clarity the key differences between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, and this clears up (for the relatively uninitiated, in whose ranks I place myself) some of the difficulties in the beginning of "Phenomenology of Perception," not always the most approachable of texts. Excellent, and well worth the effort to get to grips with the work of a major continental philosopher.A small caveat: for some reason, the hyper-linked end notes on the Kindle for iPhone edition I purchased don't work at all, which makes for time-consuming reading. Hopefully the publishers will sort this problem out in due course.

I just checked this book out from the new books shelf at my university library, and after reading just 30 pages, I must say it is by far the best written general introduction to Merleau-Ponty I have yet read. I've been conducting research on Merleau-Ponty for the purpose of a paper on his political thought for about a month now, and I have found the best secondary literature on Merleau-Ponty to be erudite and focused but not particularly helpful to one beginning with the texts. On the other hand, those philosophical texts which fancy themselves as introductory or general are almost universally awful (I must exclude  Phenomenology Of Merleau Ponty: A Search For The Limits Of Consciousness (Series In Continental Thought) - an excellent and learned general, though not quite introductory, text). This text manages to be a general and clear introduction while at the same time being very learned and non-superficial. Moreover, its five-page introduction to phenomenology is the best statement of the strength and place of phenomenology I have yet read. If you care anything about phenomenology or Merleau-Ponty you must read this book.

The author explains thoroughly and with clarity why it is imperative to understand MP's phenomenology.

Incredible introduction to, in my opinion, the most creative and interesting philosopher of the 20th century. This is an absolute necessity for anyone who wishes to understand Merleau-Ponty and the profundity of his thought.

Great seller! The content was what I expected.

In the review above, Matthew Perry writes: "This text manages to be a general and clear introduction while at the same time being very learned and non-superficial. Moreover, its five-page introduction to phenomenology is the best statement of the strength and place of phenomenology I have yet read. If you care anything about phenomenology or Merleau-Ponty you must read this book." I could not agree more. This is an excellent introduction to Merleau-Ponty's thought through all of its phases. It is very clearly written and accessible. I highly recommend it to readers wishing to a get a grip on the thought of this important philosopher.

A phenomenal book for anyone interested in the complex but highly rewarding philosophy of Merleau-Ponty.