The Compleat Victory: Saratoga and the American Revolution (Pivotal Moments in American History)

The major turning point of the American War for Independence is almost universally agreed upon to be the Battle (or, more accurately, “battles”) of Saratoga; the violent and fierce confrontation that put an end to the British invasion from Canada and resulted in the short term in the surrender of upwards of 5,000 British troops. In the long term it resulted in the direct involvement of the Kingdom of France in favor of the American separatists. The local rebellion flared up into another world war for empire and Britain found itself dealing with more than it bargained for. In his recent study of the American and British campaigns of 1777 The Compleat Victory: Saratoga and the American Revolution, Kevin J. Weddle takes a fresh look at the great turning point in a book that proves to be a fascinating mix of fresh perspectives and tried-and true historical opinion. His major arguments throughout the book center on what he calls “grip”, being a commander’s ability to “manage a battle or campaign by personally scrutinizing and supervising all elements of a military operation” (5). The book analyzes all the major commanders and their subalterns on both sides of the Saratoga campaign to see how they match up to this idea. In short, Weddle argues convincingly that most of the American commanders, despite their setbacks and early defeats, ultimately had “grip,” whereas the British commanders, despite their clear abilities and talents, ultimately did not (379). Weddle argues that the British failure in 1777 resulted not from lack of talent and ability but by the fact that no general in North America had overall command, and that this overall command resided far away in London (63, 382). One of the age-old “truths” of the Saratoga campaign is that Burgoyne’s northern army was to be supported by and eventually link up with the army under the command of Howe. Weddle argues this to be a myth, pointing out that Burgoyne’s official plan never called for this (61), and that Howe’s other campaign to Philadelphia was also approved by Germain and King George (71). The British government had approved two separate campaigns, neither of which was to directly benefit or cooperate with the other. Weddle lays out in detail the various letters before and during the campaign that either never mentioned such a link-up or advised it only if it became practical. He even supplies the reader with a detailed appendix (“Appendix C”) which lays out the details of the authorship, sending, receipt, and basic content of each letter or report. In short, Weddle argues that Howe and Burgoyne were each on their own, and that early on Burgoyne understood this and was perfectly fine with it. Once he needed someone to blame, he made the advised possibility of the link-up at Albany, NY to be the main goal of the campaign all along (70, 252, etc.). When it comes to his key point of “grip” Weddle primarily discusses Burgoyne and Howe on the British side and Washington, Schuyler, Gates and Arnold on the American side. Countering traditional narratives, he demonstrates that Burgoyne was not a bumbling British gentleman out of his element, nor was Schuyler an inept coward. On the contrary, Weddle demonstrates that early in the campaign, Burgoyne exhibited effective command and control during the most successful part of his advance. It was only after a string of setbacks took their toll that Burgoyne, still not lacking battlefield energy and talent, lost his sense of the overall operational and strategic situation (252, 386). Likewise, Weddle aims to give General Schuyler the credit he reasonably deserves for being able to preserve the American army after the fall of Fort Ticonderoga and convincingly argues that the man did not lack effective command skills. Weddle presents the image of a general who was able to effectively defend hundreds of miles of territory at a time, setting up his successor, Horatio Gates, for the final victory. If Schuyler lacked anything, Weddle argues, it was self-confidence, the lack of which was indeed severe, and led to his eventual replacement (387). Weddle argues throughout the book that Washington had a better grasp of the situation in North America than did his British counterpart Sir William Howe. Weddle sets up an American commander who was in control of both his immediate responsibilities and of people and events hundreds of miles away. Contrarily, Lord Howe is presented as basically cutting Burgoyne loose, and showing no interest in command and control over the British northern operations. While these various arguments and presentations by Weddle do hold up, the book does suffer from a few defects. One of the most interesting is Weddle’s reliance on secondary sources rather than primary sources for two whole chapters in the middle of the book as he discusses the Battle of Oriskany and the campaign around it (see the notes to chapters 12 and 13). Everywhere else, Weddle provides numerous primary citations from reports and letters, but in these two chapters the primary sources are heavily outgunned by an onrush of secondary authors. The book also suffers from a small but noticeable array of typographical errors, which would go unmentioned if some of them did not include important details about time and place. It can also be noted that for a campaign that involved many Native American warriors on both sides, the discussion of their involvement could have received more focus. All in all, Weddle does what he sets out to do; to analyze the British and American commanders and their successes and failures in command and control. The book should be of interest for scholars of the American War of Independence and “armchair historians” both, as Weddle certainly brings together all the details necessary for a scholarly work, while writing in a clear and concise manner that would find welcome among the popular audience.

Before reading this book, I first reread the classic account, Saratoga, by Richard Ketchum, which has been considered a standard account since its publication in 1997. I thoroughly enjoyed the experience of rereading Ketchum’s book after nearly 25 years and posted a very favorable Amazon review of my impressions. It was therefore with some skepticism that I read the recently published The Compleat Victory by Kevin Weddle. I wondered how anyone could do a finer account of the Saratoga Campaign than the late Richard Ketchum. Despite some disagreements, criticism, and quibbles that I have about Weddle’s book, I have no trouble praising it as the best account to date.There are a number of similarities in the treatment of the Saratoga by the two authors, as might be expected. As my review of Ketchum’s work covered a lot of ground, I will confine my review of The Compleat Victory to differences with the Ketchum account and voice some praise/criticism of certain sections of Weddle’s book.First, it is no slight to Weddle to conclude that Ketchum is the better writer and storyteller. Ketchum is an elegant, fluid, and engaging writer who also frequently writes evocatively of the landscapes and inserts more human-interest stories into his account. His concluding paragraph of the entire book is a fine example. Weddle is more workmanlike and get-to-the point in his prose. Though certain early sections were a tad dense, I did find that Weddle hit his stride as the narrative later gathered speed and interest.In my Amazon review of Ketchum’s book, I complimented him on the extensive research he did for his book in the very early days of the internet before online resources were more readily available. In addition to his own original research, Weddle has taken advantage of research, primary sources and other books on the Saratoga campaign that have become available since the publication of the Ketchum work. In addition, Weddle had the invaluable assistance of the intrepid Eric Schnitzer, historian of the Saratoga National Historical Park, as evidenced by frequent references to him throughout the book.Weddle does an excellent job of discussing both American and British strategy before the Saratoga campaign, along with examining the tension between senior commanders on both sides. The review of British leaders and military commanders’ correspondence is a bit confusing, which I suppose is no surprise as it was so obtuse and confusing even to the parties to the letters, and understandably sowed the seeds of the British failure at Saratoga. Also, events easily overtook the letters that could take months to reach the recipient (if they even received them), leaving dated understandings in place.My first disagreement with Weddle is regarding the impact of the battle of Valcour Island, an amazing strategic victory by Benedict Arnold in the fall of 1776. Weddle acknowledges that most historians have credited Arnold’s actions in delaying Carleton such that the latter decided to retreat back to Quebec before the onset of winter, but disagrees with them. Perhaps a defensible, contrarian position by Weddle, but he cites only two unreliable sources. First is Carleton himself. Why would Carleton admit that his invasion plans were defeated by Arnold’s ragtag naval force? The second source is a British naval captain, but Weddle does not indicate whether the captain was with Carleton when the decision was made and the captain does not comment on the reason(s) for the withdrawal. Very unconvincing sources.Weddle also disagrees with “most” historians who concur with Arthur St. Clair’s decision to abandon Ticonderoga as he was being surrounded by Burgoyne’s forces. Weddle complains that St. Clair should have focused on his force’s capabilities rather than its vulnerabilities, but never clearly spells out for readers what those capabilities were. St. Clair arrived at Ticonderoga only three weeks before Burgoyne’s arrival when the state of preparations was poor. He was severely undermanned; Weddle admits that Congress and Washington failed to send adequate reinforcements. The British were quickly enveloping Ticonderoga and cutting off any means of retreat. St. Clair’s decision was supported by his subordinate senior commanding officers. It should also be pointed out that a pitched battle would have probably resulted in the fortifications being overwhelmed and Burgoyne’s Indian forces would have no doubt scalped and slaughtered surrendering Patriot soldiers. Any survivors would have been sent off to prison ships around New York where most would have died. Instead, St. Clair’s men lived to fight another day. Weddle’s description of St. Clair as “feckless” is therefore a bit of a low blow under the circumstances.I certainly agree, however, with the author’s justifiable criticism of St. Clair for not preparing earlier for an orderly evacuation of Ticonderoga. The actual retreat was poorly executed. There is also a significant conflict in the numbers of cannon captured that Weddle does not address let alone resolve (see numbers on page 124 as contrasted with footnote 4 on page 439).Weddle profitably expends significantly more ink on the events at Fort Stanwix and the battle at Oriskany than does Ketchum. Had St. Leger’s forces broken through here and proceeded on to aid Burgoyne, events at Saratoga may have been altered though I believe the result would have been the same given St. Leger's small numbers. The chapters on Stanwix and Oriskany are among the more engaging of Weddle’s book. In support of my earlier argument that Burgoyne’s Indian forces would have slaughtered inhabitants of Ticonderoga, it is of note that St. Leger threatened to have his Indian allies do the same to the defenders of Fort Stanwix.Ketchum indicates Clinton only grudgingly sent forces up the Hudson to aid Burgoyne at Saratoga. Weddle convincingly demonstrates that Clinton was genuinely concerned about Burgoyne’s increasingly desperate situation and did what he could with the forces he had while still needing to be available to assist Howe at Philadelphia and garrison/defend New York City. Ketchum’s indication of the fall of Fort Montgomery and Fort Clinton to Clinton (no relation!) as being easy victories for the British is belied by the casualty descriptions by Weddle.The bitter Gates-Arnold feud following the battle of Freeman’s Farm takes up way too much space in the Weddle book, taking as many pages as the narrative on the actual combat at the battle. Ketchum handled the feud effectively in only two pages and does not feel the need to recite the petty gossip of Schulyer’s subordinates as Weddle indulges.Weddle, however, does much to enhance Gates’ reputation by showing Gates indeed actively managed the battles of Freeman’s Farm and Bemis Heights. Weddle also deserves a great deal of credit for demolishing the myth that Benedict Arnold’s feud with Gates continued to the battle of Bemis Heights and that he went on an unauthorized ride out of camp to rally Patriot forces in attacking the British fortifications. Instead, Arnold and Gates worked collaboratively in pursuing the attacks.The concluding chapters of The Compleat Victory dealing with British and American strategy, performance and overall effectiveness contain outstanding analysis by Weddle.Weddle points out a perceptive observation from Alexander Hamilton who in describing the futility of the British overall strategy observed that an immense British army would have been needed to post along the Lake Champlain/Hudson corridor numerous forces to cut off the northern colonies from the southern colonies. Indeed, Burgoyne found himself draining his army to garrison posts along the corridor to safeguard his supply route from Quebec. These smaller forces were then very vulnerable to attack from Patriot forces who could attack them in detail. So, the armchair “generals” in London looking at a map of ground across an ocean failed to appreciate the supply and logistics challenges of the campaign (as did Burgoyne).The maps in the Weddle book are mostly better than those in the Ketchum book though they still sometimes are lacking references listed in the narrative. For some reason, the map of the battle of Bennington is shrunken to the point a magnifying glass is practically needed. There are some typos that should have been caught by a better proofreader. Finally, the beginning of the Weddle book contains a number of contractions that should have been eliminated. One additional contraction is found a little later and just when I thought they had been excised a straggler contraction appears two pages before the end of the narrative. For a work such as this fine book, contractions are a no-no.The final judgment on the Ketchum and Weddle books? I still believe Ketchum’s version is better written and especially a better choice for a first-time reader on the Saratoga campaign. For those familiar with the campaign, the Weddle book is now the go-to book as it incorporates new research and analysis not found (or perhaps available) in the Ketchum book. Both are excellent accounts and perhaps are best read back-to-back for a broad perspective.One additional comment and compliment to Weddle. As an avid reader of Civil War history, I have noticed a disturbing trend in recent years for many authors to launch personal attacks against fellow authors who have preceded them and with whom the new authors disagree. I suppose this trend is in keeping with our unfortunately polarized politics. Disagree with whomever you wish, but keep it professional. Weddle professionally describes Ketchum’s book as the standard account and never attacks Ketchum or other authors personally when disagreeing with their conclusions. Bonus points are therefore due to Weddle.

I recommend this book as a great reference to the battle of Saratoga. During the American revolution, this battle not only changed the tactical and operational status, but it also paved the road to final American victory in the strategic sense.

The book is very well written and a pleasure to read as have all the books in the Pivotal Moments series. The scholarship is top notch translating into the enjoyment. However, as with other reviewers, my hardback copy also fell apart about have way through the book. The pages split away from the spine in the 2nd color plate section. Distressing enough, I heard the author give a presentation on his book recently and had him sign the book, albeit before I started reading it. I have a fairly extensive historical library. Not sure what I'm going to do. Oxford needs to look into this matter.